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30 CooPER v. CooPER [49 C.2d 
[S. F. No. 19475. In Bank. Aug. 13, 1957.] 
HAROLD EDWARD COOPER, JR., a Minor, etc., et al., 
Respondents, v. IDA COOPER, Individually and as Ex-
ecutrix, etc., Appellant. 
[1] Insurance-Proceeds-Persons Entitled-Effect of Divorce De-
cree.-In an action to establish that children were entitled 
to the proceeds of insurance policies assigned by their father to 
their mother in a property settlement agreement providing that 
the husband would execute appropriate instruments, as re-
quired, to provide that the wife and a designated bank would 
act as joint trustees to administer the proceeds for the sup-
port of the wife and minor children, the court's determination 
that the agreement had not been abandoned or superseded by 
a divorce decree obtained by the wife was not supported 
where the evidence showed that she made no attempt to dis-
cover whether a trust instrument had been executed by the 
husband, where he made the payments for child support 
ordered by the decree rather than those agreed on in the 
settlement (which was not incorporated in the decree), where 
she accepted those payments, where he remarried and im-
mediately surrendered some policies and changed the bene-
ficiary of the other policy, which was a clear indication 
that he considered the agreement no longer binding on him, 
and where in the interlocutory decree prepared by the wife's 
attorney it was declared that the agreement had been "fully 
consummated"; under such circumstances the divorced wife 
and the children did not have a vested interest in the policies. 
[2] !d.-Actions-Limitations and Laches.-In an action to estab-
lish that children were entitled to the proceeds of certain 
insurance policies assigned by father to mother in a prop-
erty settlement agreement providing that the husband would 
execute appropriate instruments, as required, to provide that 
the wife and a designated bank would act as joint trustees to 
administer the proceeds for the support of the wife and minor 
children, the statute of limitations was not set in motion until 
the date of the husband's death, and plaintiffs were not guilty 
of neglect in failing to ascertain whether or not the policies 
were in full force and effect prior to the time their cause 
of action accrued. 
[3] !d.-Proceeds-Persons Entitled-Effect of Divorce Decree.-
A divorced wife had no interest in the insurance policies of 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Insurance, § 361. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 3] Insurance, § 220(4); [2] Insur-
ance, §§ 2401 244. 
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her husband at the date of his death where his obligation for 
her support, under the terms of the divorce decree, termi-
nated on her remarriage; and the interest of the children was 
limited to the amount necessary for their support measured 
by provisions of the divorce decree prior to reaching their 
majority. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San 
Mateo County. Aylett R. Cotton, Judge. Reversed with 
directions. 
Action to recover the proceeds of insurance policies. Juug-
ment for plaintiffs reversed with directions. 
Raymond B. Haizlip and A. Brooks Berlin for Appellant. 
Sullivan & West, Clyde S. West and James B. O'Grady for 
Respondents. 
CARTER J.-Defendant, Ida Cooper, appeals individually 
and as executrix of the estate of Harold E. Cooper, from a 
judgment in favor of Vera P. Alves, Harold E. Cooper and 
Carolyn Joan Cooper, the former wife and minor children of 
the decedent. 
Vera and Harold Cooper were married in 1933. Two chil-
dren, Harold, Jr. and Carolyn were born to them in 1935 and 
1938, respectively. On May 21, 1948, in contemplation of a 
legal separation, Vera and Harold entered into a property 
settlement and separation agreement. By its terms Vera re-
tained the family home and automobile and Harold certain 
tools and shop equipment. It was agreed that Vera was to 
have custody of the minor children and Harold was to pay 
to Vera the sum of $100 per month for her support and the 
sum of $90 per month support for the minor children. Each 
party retained, under the agreement, the personal property in 
his or her possession. 
At the time this agreement was executed there were four 
policies of insurance in force on the life of Harold. Three 
policies, totaling a principal sum of $7,500, were issued by 
the Northwestern Mutual Insurance Company; one policy, in 
the principal sum of $7,500 (now worth $12,000), was issued 
by the Equitable Life Assurance Society. Vera was the named 
beneficiary in all of these policies. 
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The agreement provided, with to the policies of 
insurance, as follows :1 
"Eighth: The husband shall and does hereby release, trans-
fer, sell, assign and set over to the wife, all right, title and 
interest t:n and to three certain life insurance policies written 
in the Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company of 
Milwaukee, Wisconsin, in the total principal sum of $7,500, 
wherein the wife now appears as beneficiary and the husband 
as insured; the httsband shall exectde appropriate instrument 
as required by said insurance company and the American 
Trust Company, to provide that the wife and said American 
Trust Company shall act as joint trustees to administer the 
proceeds of said life insurance policies for the support and 
maintenance of the wife and said minor children, in the event 
of husband's death. 
''The husband shall pay all premiums on said policies as 
they become due and shall maintain said policies in full 
force and effect. Husband shall also pay when due all bills for 
interest on indebtedness now outstanding against said policies, 
and shall not take any further action which will increase 
indebtedness against said policies or diminish the cash sur-
render value thereof. When the youngest of the said two 
minor children shall have reached majority, the wife's rights 
in and to said life insurance policies shall cease, and the 
husband shall have the right to designate a new beneficiary or 
cancel or otherwise dispose of said policies as he may desire. 
"Ninth: The husband agrees to pay all premiums and to 
keep in full force and effect until the younger of the two 
minor children shall have reached majority, group life insur-
ance in the present approximate principal amount of $7,500 
written in the Equitable Life Assurance Society, 2 which the 
husband now carries as an employee of the American Trust 
Company and in which the wife is named as beneficiary. It is 
understood and agreed that such group insurance is mandatory 
so long as husband is employed by said American Trust Com-
pany, and that the principal amount and premiums vary from 
time to time depending on loss experience of the insurance 
company. 
11 The husband shall execute appropriate instrument to 
provide that the wife and said American Trust Company 
shall act as joint trustees, to administer the proceeds of said 
'The italicized portions are those under attack in the present pro-
~ing. 
IIJ'hia policy provided that it was nontransferable. 
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imntrance policy for the support and maintenance of the 
wife and said minor children, in the event of husband's 
death. When the younger of the said two minor children 
shaU have reached majority, the wife's rights in and to said 
policy shall cease, and the husband shall have the right to 
designate a new beneficiary or cancel or otherwise dispose of 
said policy as he may desire." 
In February, 1949, V em obtained an interlocutory decree 
of divorce which became final on March 6, 1950. Harold was 
ordered to pay to Vera, for her support, the sum of $100 
per month until her remarriage, and $100 per month for the 
support of the two minor children. The interlocutory decree 
recited that it appeared to the court that "the parties had 
heretofore entered into an agreement of separation dated May 
21, 1948, which said agreement has been fully consummated . 
. . . " (Emphasis added.) The final decree of divorce made no 
reference to the separation and property settlement agreement. 
Subsequent to the divorce Harold paid $100 per month for 
the support of the children rather than the $90 provided for 
in the agreement. 
After the divorce had become final, Vera married one 
Alves, and Harold married the defendant, Ida. After his 
remarriage Harold surrendered the three Northwestern Mu-
tual policies for their cash value and changed the beneficiary 
of the Equitable policy from Vera to Ida. 
Subsequent to the execution of the agreement but prior to 
the divorce action the parties negotiated through their common 
attorney with respect to a trust instrument. One draft was 
finally signed by Vera but it was never signed by Harold 
or the American Trust Company. 
Harold died on September 17, 1954. He left a will in which 
Ida was named residuary legatee and executrix. One provi-
sion thereof declared "I intentionally omit to make provision 
for my children, Harold E. Cooper, Jr., and Carolyn Joan 
Cooper, as they are otherwise adequately provided for." 
Shortly after Harold's death, Ida filed a claim with Equita-
ble for the proceeds of the policy on Harold's life. There-
after Vera and the two minor children brought suit against 
Ida, individually, and as executrix, Northwestern Mutual and 
Equitable. 3 The plaintiffs sought to recover the proceeds of 
•Equitable deposited in court the sum of $12,000, and the suit against 
it was dismissed. The suit against Northwestern was dismissed b7 
stipulation . 
... c.2d-l 
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the policies mentioned in the agreement; or if they had been 
paid to Ida to recover the proceeds from her; or if any of the 
policies had been surrendered by Harold to recover the pro-
ceeds from Ida as executrix. 
The trial court found that the agreement which had been 
entered into between Vera and Harold had not been merged 
in the decree of divorce or abandoned. It concluded that 
plaintiffs were the equitable owners of the proceeds of all 
four policies; that the sum of $12,000 paid into court be 
paid to plaintiffs and that plaintiffs recover from the estate 
of Harold the value of the three Northwestern policies sur-
rendered by Harold, together with interest on both amounts 
from the date of Harold's death. 
The primary question here presented for determination is 
whether the evidence supports the conclusion of the trial court 
that the agreement survived the decree of divorce procured 
by Vera. 
In both paragraphs of the agreement relating to the insur-
ance policies Harold was to execute "appropriate instru-
ment[s)" to provide that the wife and American Trust 
Company were to act as joint trustees to administer the 
proceeds of the policies to provide for the support and 
maintenance of both the wife and minor children in the event 
of Harold's death. No such instrument was ever executed 
although Vera did sign one proposed draft and testified that 
she "took it for granted" that the trust instrument had been 
signed by Harold and the American Trust Company. 
The interlocutory decree of divorce which was prepared by 
Vera's attorney contained this statement: "And it appearing 
to the Court that the parties had heretofore entered into an 
agreement of separation dated May 21, 1948, which said agree-
ment has been fully consummated." (Emphasis added.) At 
no time, of course, was the agreement fully consummated since 
the contemplated trust agreement concerning the four insur-
ance policies had never been executed. The above-quoted 
statement constitutes the only reference in either decree to 
the agreement. The decree differs from the agreement in two 
respects: First, it awards to Vera the sum of $100 per month, 
''until further order of the Court, or until the remarriage of 
plaintiff [Vera]." (Emphasis added.) The agreement pro-
vided for the payment to her, by Harold, of the sum of $100 
per month without any such provision for termination. Sec-
ondly, the agreement provided that Harold would pay $90 
per month for the support of the two minor children until 
Aug.1957] CooPER v. CooPER 
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they reached majority "unless sooner married or deceased"; 
the decree provided that Harold would pay $100 per month 
for the support and maintenance of the minor children "until 
further order of the Court." The record shows that up until 
the effective date of the decree, Harold paid $90 per month 
for the support of the minor children; that thereafter he 
paid $100 per month for their support. The record is com-
pletely silent as to whether he .paid Vera anything for her 
own support after her remarriage. 
The divorce obtained by Vera became final on March 6, 
1950. Sometime thereafter (the date does not appear) Harold 
was remarried to defendant. On October 3, 1951 (after his 
remarriage), Harold surrendered the three Northwestern 
policies for their cash value of $7,500. On or about Novem-
ber 17, 1950, he changed the beneficiary of the Equitable 
policy from Vera to defendant, Ida, his then wife. 
After Vera signed the draft of the proposed trust instru-
ment (this was, apparently sometime in 1948), from all that 
appears she made no effort to ascertain whether or not the 
instrument was ever executed by Harold and the American 
Trust Company. 
Harold's will, executed on July 19, 1954, contained the 
following statement: ''SIXTH: I intentionally omit to make 
provisions for my children, HAROLD E. CooPER, JR., and 
CAROLYN JoAN CooPER, as they are otherwise adequately pro-
vided for." So far as appears, other than the agreement and 
the decree, no provision was made for the children. 
[1] We are of the opinion that there is no evidence sup-
porting the trial court's determination that the agreement had 
not been abandoned or superseded by the decree of divorce 
obtained by Vera. On the contrary, the record shows that 
Vera procured a divorce and made no attempt to discover 
whether a trust instrument had been executed by Harold; 
that Harold made the payments for child support ordered by 
the decree rather than those agreed upon in the agreement; 
that Vera accepted those payments; that after the divorce 
was granted Harold remarried and immediately surrendered 
the Northwestern policies and changed the beneficiary of the 
Equitable policy which was a clear indication that he con-
sidered the agreement no longer binding upon him; and that 
in the interlocutory decree prepared by Vera's attorney it 
was declared that the agreement had been "fully consum-
mated." 
Vera's argument that she and the children had a vested 
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interest in the policies of insurance because of the terms 
of the separation agreement must fail. The cases cited 
in support of her argument are not in point. In Waxman v. 
Citizens Nat. Trust & Sav. Bank, 123 Cal.App.2d 145, 149 
[266 P.2d 48], by the terms of a property settlement agree-
ment, the daughter was named as irrevocable beneficiary of a 
policy of insurance. The property settlement agreement was 
approved in the interlocutory decree of divorce. The parties 
sought by written agreement, to modify the property set-
tlement agreement as it affected the daughter. The court 
held that the daughter had a vested equitable interest in the 
life insurance policy which could not be defeated without her 
consent. In the case at bar, the paragraphs of the agreement 
relating to the insurance policies provided that trust instru-
ments were to be executed with Vera and the Bank as co-
trustees. There is no indication in the record that such in-
struments were ever executed by Harold and we cannot 
speculate as to what the terms of such instruments would be. 
In the Waxman case the property settlement agreement was 
complete in itself and was, furthermore, approved by the 
court in the divorce action. In Shoudy v. Shoudy, 55 Cal. 
App. 344, 350 [203 P. 433], the parties had entered into an 
agreement regarding certain policies of insurance which were 
to be kept in full force and effect with plaintiff, decedent's 
first wife, as beneficiary. The court held that plaintiff had 
acquired fixed and vested "rights or equities" because of 
the complete agreement entered into between the parties. In 
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Franck, 9 Cal.App.2d 528, 531, 534 
[50 P.2d 480], by the terms of a property settlement agree-
ment, the wife was made the sole, irrevocable beneficiary 
of certain policies of insurance. The court held that an in-
sured could waive his right to change the beneficiary of a 
life insurance policy and by contract convert a contingent 
interest in the policy into a "vested equitable interest which 
may not be subsequently defeated by an effort to change the 
beneficiary without his consent." The agreement under 
consideration here so far as the insurance policies were con-
cerned was not self-executing inasmuch as it was specifically 
provided that the policies were to become the subject matter 
of a trust to be set up at some subsequent time. As we have 
heretofore noted, Vera made no attempt to ascertain whether 
the "appropriate instrument [ s] " had ever been executed 
and her conduct in procuring a decree of divorce in which it 
was stated that the agreement had been fully consummated 
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leads to the conclusion that the portions of the agreement 
which had not been carried out had been abandoned by the 
parties. 
[2] There is no merit to defendant's arguments that plain-
tiffs must fail because of the statute of limitations or because 
of laches. The statute of limitations (Code Civ. Proc., § 337, 
subd. is not set in motion until the date of the decedent's 
death in a case such as this (Waxman v. Citizens Nat. Trust 
& Sav. Bank, 123 Cal.App.2d 145, 149 [266 P.2d 48] ). Plain-
tiffs had no cause of action until Harold's death and were, 
therefore, not guilty of neglect in failing to ascertain whether 
or not the policies of insurance were in full force and effect 
prior to the time their cause of action accrued. 
[3] We have concluded that Vera had no interest in the 
policies at the date of Harold's death, because Harold's 
obligation for her support, under the terms of the divorce 
decree, terminated upon her remarriage; and that the interest 
of the children in the estate of their father is limited to the 
amount necessary for their support measured by the provisions 
of the divorce decree prior to reaching their majority. 
The judgment is reversed with directions to the trial court 
to enter judgment in accordance with the views herein ex-
pressed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., Spence, 
and McComb J., concurred. 
Respondents' petition for a rehearing was denied September 
11, 1957. 
